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THE BATTLE OVER SCIENTIFIC WHALING: A NEW
PROPOSAL TO STOP JAPAN’S LETHAL RESEARCH AND
REFORM THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION
LAURA HOEY*
Hugest of living creatures, in the deep
Stretched like a promontory sleeps or swims,
And seems a moving land; and at his gills
Draws in, and at his breath spouts out a sea.
–John Milton, Paradise Lost†
INTRODUCTION
The whale had been harpooned at 10.15 in the
morning. . . . Apparently the master already realized that
they had an unusually wary and resourceful whale on their
harpoon. Normally these whalers harpoon, chase, lance
and kill their whales in about an hour and 20 minutes.
Already this whale had succeeded in avoiding the fatal
lancing from the canoa for two hours . . . 13.12 — . . . And
so the hunt goes, hour upon hour, the brave bull whale,
through the day lanced again and again, dives and eludes,
dragging the whalers after him. . . . The hunt begins
against at dawn . . . 06.55 — . . . The harpooner throws the
lance repeatedly, in the end using the lance to jab deeply
without throwing. Twenty-one thrusts are made, and the
whale begins spouting fountains of blood . . . 07.46 — . . .
The whale surfaces, seems tired, confused, hurt. The har-
pooner thrusts his lance 18 times more . . . 08.07 — Still
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2017; B.A. Law & Society, American
University, 2011. Thank you to the staff of the William & Mary Environmental Law and
Policy Review for their efforts on this Note. Thank you also to my husband, Keegan, for
his continued support as I move forward in this career. This Note is dedicated to those
who work to protect these magnificent creatures.
† JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 209 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
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lancing, there is no point in counting. The harpooner is
working close enough to jab the lance deeply, over and
over . . . 09.55 — The whale is dead. . . . The whale has
taken 23 hours and 40 minutes to die.1
Japanese scientific whaling in the Antarctic has long angered wild-
life conservationists. Many say that Japanese whaling is for commercial,
rather than scientific, purposes. In 2014, conservationists saw a huge
victory when the United Nations International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)
ruled that Japan’s killing of Antarctic whales, whose meat ends up sold
in shops and restaurants, was unjustified. Just one year later, Japanese
whalers announced that they will resume hunting minke whales in the
Antarctic as part of a revised scientific research program.
The policies of the International Whaling Commission (the “Com-
mission”) and scientific whaling have been under attack since the early
1960s. Specifically, Japan has taken the brunt of the criticism for its
scientific whaling initiatives. The recent Hague decision demonstrates
how the Commission is failing when it comes to controlling Japanese
whaling. This Note proposes a trifold solution that could be implemented
to solve the scientific whaling problem: (1) address Japanese cultural per-
ceptions of whaling through grassroots campaigns; (2) address Japan’s
food security concerns; and (3) address the Commission itself through
various reforms.
First, this Note will examine the relevant history of the Commis-
sion, beginning with its conception to its current state. Next, this Note
will examine Japan’s position in regards to whaling since the founding
of the Commission. An in-depth analysis of whaling in the Antarctic will
follow along with Japan’s response to the decision. Finally, this Note will
identify the root cause of Japan’s insistence on scientific whaling and
propose a solution to address such concerns.
I. HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION
In 1930, the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Pro-
gressive Codification of International Law prepared a report recommend-
ing a convention to regulate the exploitation of products of the sea.2 The
1 DAVID DAY, THE WHALE WAR 144–47 (1987). This particular hunt was recorded by ecolo-
gist David Moody in July 1979.
2 TUOMAS KUOKKANEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: VARIATIONS ON A
THEME 129 (2002).
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Economic Committee received this report, and after conferring with the
International Council for the Exploitation of the Seas (“ICES”), concluded
that a whaling convention was necessary.3 As a result, in September of
1931 a convention was held in Geneva [hereinafter the 1931 Conven-
tion].4 Although limited, the 1931 Convention was the first major inter-
national agreement regulating whaling.5 The 1931 Convention prohibited
the taking and killing of whales, calves, suckling whales, immature whales,
and female whales accompanied by calves.6 The scope of the 1931 Con-
vention was broadened in 1937 and again in 1938.7 While sound in theory,
practically, these agreements had little effect on the whaling industry.8
True efforts to regulate whaling did not begin until the end of the
Second World War.9 Under the United States’ leadership,10 on December 2,
1946, in Washington, fifteen nations11 convened to sign the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (the “ICRW”).12 This treaty
created the International Whaling Commission (the “IWC”).13 The 1946
Convention sought to safeguard “for future generations the great natural
resources represented by the whale stocks” by confining whaling opera-
tions “to those species best able to sustain exploitation in order to give an
interval for recovery to certain species of whales now depleted in num-
bers.”14 In contrast to the 1931 Convention and subsequent amendments,
3 Id.
4 KURKPATRICK DORSEY, WHALES & NATIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY ON THE HIGH
SEAS 43 (2013).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 49.
8 R. Michael M’Gonigle, The Economizing of Ecology: Why Big, Rare Whales Still Die, 9
ECOLOGY L.Q. 131 (1980).
9 DORSEY, supra note 4, at 82.
10 M’Gonigle, supra note 8, at 132–33. While no longer a whaling nation, the United States
both organized and drafted proposals for the convention. Two policy reasons explain why
the United States took such an active role: (1) the need for capital in war-torn countries
was high. Whales were seen as a free resource that could provide both consumption goods
in the form of meat and capital in the form of oil; and (2) American postwar political
strategy. As the leader in this international organization, the United States maintained
a voice in a global industry.
11 Membership and Contracting Governments, INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION,
https://iwc.int/members [https://perma.cc/27YU-UPAH] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
12 DORSEY, supra note 4, at 114.
13 Id. at 124.
14 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Preamble, Dec. 2, 1946, 62
Stat. 1716 [hereinafter ICRW].
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the IWC had greater power to regulate whaling through a Schedule.15 The
Schedule set forth regulations regarding (1) protected and unprotected
species; (2) open and closed seasons; (3) open and closed waters, includ-
ing designated sanctuary areas; (4) size limits for each species; (5) time,
methods, and intensity of whaling; (6) types of gear allowed; and (7) meth-
ods of measurement and catch returns and other records.16 The IWC had
the power to directly amend the Schedule, thus giving it the power to
directly regulate whaling.17
Although an improvement over the 1930s-era whaling efforts, the
IWC proved weak as well. Only nations who signed the treaty were
bound to the Schedule.18 However, even these nations could escape any
subsequent Schedule amendments by objecting within ninety days.19
Furthermore, while the treaty did provide for prosecutions of offenders,
such prosecutions were the responsibility of the “Government having
jurisdiction over the offence.”20 In practice, this meant that there was no
guarantee a contracting government would actually prosecute its citizens
for alleged infractions.21
Some conservationists went as far to call the IWC a whalers’ club
where nations “sat down at the table and bargained until they agreed
among themselves what the sporting number of whales to be bagged
[that] year would be.”22 Thus, many saw the IWC and its Schedule as a
“kind of ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between nations to abide by sporting
rules: an exact date for the opening of the season, a ban on the killing of
nursing mothers and undersized whales, and an immediate end to the
killing when the quota was reached.”23
The fact that none of these gentlemen stuck to their agreement
can be seen in the following two figures: Figure 124 shows the catches of
Blue, Fin, Sei/Bryde’s and Minke whales from 1910 until 1980.
15 KUOKKANEN, supra note 2, at 130.
16 ICRW, supra note 14, at Article V.
17 Id.
18 MICHAEL LUCK, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TOURISM AND RECREATION IN MARINE ENVIRON-
MENTS 443 (2008).
19 M’Gonigle, supra note 8, at 135. Surprisingly, it was actually the United States that
insisted on this provision over fears of national sovereignty.
20 ICRW, supra note 14, at Article IX.
21 See M’Gonigle, supra note 8.
22 DAY, supra note 1, at 27.
23 Id.
24 S. FROST, WHALES AND WHALING, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INQUIRY FOR THE GOVERN-
MENT OF AUSTRALIA 32 (1978).
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Figure 225 shows the catches of Sperm and Humpback whales for
the same time period.
25 Id.
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Tragically, the Schedule as adopted in the 1946 conference actu-
ally worked to encourage whaling.26 By limiting the seasons in which
whalers could hunt, nations worked to develop the most efficient ships
and killing techniques in order to maximize their share of the whaling
quotas.27 The resulting intense national competition caused an overcapi-
talized industry, coined the Whaling Olympics.28
This tragedy of the commons continued throughout the 1950s and
1960s.29 The structure of the Commission itself is the problem.30 Despite
having formed a Scientific Committee to review catch limits, the Committee
has no real power.31 Yet, conservation furthered no national interest be-
cause a majority of member nations were involved in Antarctic whaling
themselves.32
The 1970s saw the first large-scale environmental movement
against whaling in the United States.33 Domestic pressure from conserva-
tionists culminated in a ban on the importation of whale products into
the United States.34 In 1972, the United States submitted Proposal 33 at
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in
Stockholm.35 The proposal was unanimously adopted:
It is recommended that Governments agree to strengthen
the International Whaling Commission, to increase inter-
national research efforts, and as a matter of urgency to
call for an international agreement under the auspices of
the International Whaling Commission and involving all
governments concerned, for a 10-year moratorium on com-
mercial whaling.36
26 M’Gonigle, supra note 8, at 137.
27 GEORGE L. SMALL, THE BLUE WHALE 91 (1971).
28 Id.
29 DAY, supra note 1, at 28 (noting that in 1962, the USSR was suspected of having ex-
ceeded its quota of humpback whales by 5,000).
30 Id. at 28–29.
31 Id. at 29.
32 Scott McVay, Reflections on the Management of Whaling, in THE WHALE PROBLEM, A
STATUS REPORT 376 (Schevill 2d ed. 1974) (at the time the United States was leading pro-
posal for a reduction in the quota for the Antarctic, a California-based company was hunting
a population of humpback whales off the coast of California to extinction). M’Gonigle,
supra note 8, at 140.
33 RICHARD ELLIS, MEN AND WHALES 437 (1991).
34 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533–1544 (1979).
35 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June, 1972, UN
Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 Rev. I.
36 Id.
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In an ironic twist, the IWC rejected Resolution 33 (previously, “Pro-
posal 33”) in 1972 and again in 1973, failing to meet the required three-
fourths majority (see Table 1).37
TABLE 1: VOTING ON MORATORIUM AT 1972 AND 1973 MEETING38
1972 1973
Country For Against Abstain For Against Abstain
Argentina x   x   
Australia   x x   
Canada   x x   
Denmark   x   x
France   x x   
Iceland  x   x  
Japan  x   x  
Mexico x   x   
Norway  x   x  
Panama  x  x   
South Africa  x   x  
U.K. x   x   
U.S.A. x   x   
U.S.S.R.  x   x  
Total 4 6 4 8 5 1
Despite the Commission’s failure to adopt Resolution 33, the Com-
mission did make efforts to restrict whaling.39 The Commission phased
out the killing of Antarctic fin whales by 1976, established separate
quotas for male and female sperm whales, created distinct regions in the
Southern Hemisphere, refused to increase quotas for small minke whales
and reduced quotas for the sei whale.40
In a politically unpopular move, Japan and the USSR both ob-
jected to the Commission’s new efforts.41 Both countries objected to the
37 See INT’L COMM’M ON WHALING, Twenty-Fourth Report of the Commission (1972–73),
at 27.
38 PEGGY JONES, JONATHAN BARZDO, JOANNA GORDON CLARK & FRIENDS OF THE EARTH,
THE WHALE MANUAL 31 (1978).
39 See INT’L COMM’M ON WHALING, Twenty-Fifth Report of the Commission (1973–74), at 29.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 6–7.
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phase out of fin whales in the Antarctic and the catch limit of 5,000 minke
whales.42 At the time, the United States, in response to intense domestic
conservationist pressure, passed a series of legislation including the Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 197243 and the Endangered Species Act of
1973.44 More importantly, in 1971 after a dispute with Denmark over
alleged salmon overfishing, the United States passed the Pelly Amend-
ment to the Fisherman’s Protective Act.45 The Amendment provided for
sanctions against nations violating international conservation regula-
tions, including a ban on all fisheries imports from nations that conducted
“fishing operations in a manner or under circumstances which diminish
the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program.”46
This obscure piece of legislation could finally be used to “give teeth to
[the] IWC rulings internationally.”47
Despite the Secretary of Commerce’s ruling that the Japanese and
USSR objections to the IWC regulation was an action under the Pelly
Amendment, President Ford reported to Congress that he believed the
countries would respect the quotas in the future and took no further
action.48 Domestic conservationists responded by boycotting Japanese
and Soviet goods.49 It was clear that the goals of the IWC were to be
taken seriously.50
Mounting conservationist efforts toward a moratorium led to the
Australian government introducing a compromise proposal (the “New
Management Procedure”) at the Commission’s 1974 meeting.51 Under the
“selective” moratoria, each species of whales was classified into one of
three categories: Initial Management Stocks, Sustained Management
Stocks and Protection Stocks.52 The categories centered around maxi-
mum sustainable yield (“MSY”) and species were classified based on the
advice of the Scientific Committee.53 Those species above the MSY were
42 Id.
43 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1972).
44 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1973).
45 Pelly Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (1971).
46 Id.
47 DAY, supra note 1, at 32.
48 [1974–1975] TWENTY-SIXTH REP. COMM’N 25–26 (Int’l Whaling Comm’n).
49 William Hargrove, Boycott Japanese Goods: Environmentalists Harpoon Whalers, THE
DESERT SUN, Apr. 26, 1974, at D10.
50 DAY, supra note 1, at 32.
51 DAVID M. LAVIGNE, GAINING GROUND: IN PURSUIT OF ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY 116
(2006).
52 M’Gonigle, supra note 8, at 144.
53 Id.
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Initial Management Stocks, at or near were Sustained Management
Stocks and those below were Protection Stocks.54 The New Management
Procedure was adopted and came into effect in 1975.55
Many conservationists believed that the New Management Proce-
dure would cause the collapse of the whaling industry within a “year or
two.”56 To the contrary, Japan’s whaling efforts increased.57 In 1976,
Japan’s major fishing companies merged to form the Japan Joint Whal-
ing Company.58 It seemed that Japan was streamlining its whaling efforts
rather than retiring them.59 Although it remained a member of the
Commission, Japan continued to object and circumvent the Commission’s
proposed quotas and Schedules.60 For example:
in 1964, Japan finally agreed to stop the killing of blue
whales. . . . At the same time that Japan was piously
pronouncing that it was giving full protection to the blue
whale, the Japanese government licensed its whalers to
set up shore stations in Chile to go after the blues. For
four years between 1964 and 1968, the Japanese killed
690 blue whales.61
Japan’s first attempt to sidestep Commission quotas through the
scientific permit was in 1976, when Japan issued itself a permit to kill 240
Bryde’s whales despite the Commission’s zero quota for this species.62
This action prompted a change in the Commission’s rules, whereby the
members agreed to submit their proposed permits to the Scientific Com-
mittee for consideration before issuing them.63 Another concern came
before the Commission the next year regarding Japan: pirate whaling.64
While most of the noncomplying hunts were conducted by other nations,
Japan controlled the operations through corporations and the products of
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 148.
57 Joint Whaling Firm Set for Small Quota, JAPAN STOCK J., Feb. 23, 1976, at 2.
58 M’Gonigle, supra note 8, at 148.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Van Note, The Pirate Whalers, GREENPEACE CHRONICLES, Dec. 1978, at 5.
62 INT’L COMM’M ON WHALING, Twenty-Ninth Annual Meeting, Report of the Scientific
Committee (IWC/29/4) at A2.
63 Chairman’s Report of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting, 29 REP. INT’L WHALING COMM’N 13,
36 (1977).
64 ELLIS, supra note 33, at 451.
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these hunts were exported to Japan.65 In an article in the Sunday Times,
Japan’s practice of using pirate whalers and transferring vessels to non-
member nations was exposed.66 Despite increased awareness and concern
over these practices, the Commission took no action against Japan.67
The year 1979 saw an increase in pro-whaling nations to the
Commission.68 This increased support for Japan’s position was counter-
balanced by the changing policies of other member nations.69 Australia,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States all supported
full-scale moratorium proposals.70 That year saw only a small victory for
conservationists: the adoption of a pelagic moratorium and the establish-
ment of a sanctuary in the Indian Ocean.71
Non-whaling states continued to join the Commission.72 Table 2
shows how pro- or anti-whaling a member country was in the Commis-
sion. A conservationist vote scored a plus one, while a non-conservationist
vote scored minus one, with an abstention or absence scoring zero. Totaling
the numbers shows the shift towards conservation efforts during those
three years.
TABLE 2: RATING IWC MEMBER NATIONS
1978 1979 1980
Mexico +10 France +16 France +16
Panama +10 Panama +15 Netherlands +16
France +9 Netherlands +15 Oman +16
Netherlands +8 Seychelles +14 Australia +15
Argentina +6 Sweden +12 Seychelles +15
United States +6
United 
Kingdom +12 New Zealand +15
New Zealand 0 New Zealand +11 Sweden +14
65 M’Gonigle, supra note 8, at 154.
66 Id. at 166.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 170. South Korea, Peru, Chile and Spain joined whereas these countries had pre-
viously whaled outside the confines of the Commission. Sweden and Seychelles, whale
conservationists, were the other two nations to join that year.
69 Id.
70 Geoffrey Lean, Britain is Ready to Outlaw Whale Oil, THE OBSERVER, July 8, 1979, at 1.
71 Chairman’s Report of the Thirty-First Meeting, 31 REP. INT’L WHALING COMM’N 4, 24
(1979).
72 IWC, supra note 11.
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1978 1979 1980
United 
Kingdom -1 United States +10 Mexico +13
Canada -3 Australia +10
United 
Kingdom +12
Australia -3 Mexico +7 Switzerland +10
Brazil -4 Argentina +4 United States +10
South Africa -5 Canada +2 Argentina +9
Iceland -6 South Africa +1 Canada +1
Denmark -6 Spain -1 Denmark +1
Norway -7 Norway -3 South Africa 0
U.S.S.R. -9 Iceland -4 Norway -1
Japan -10 Denmark -4 Brazil -8
Brazil -6 Iceland -10
Chile -9 Chile -12
U.S.S.R. -12 Peru -12
Peru -13 South Korea -14
Korea -16 Spain -14
Japan -17 Japan -15
U.S.S.R. -15
Totals: -5  44  62
Finally, in 1982, the Commission reached the necessary three-
quarters majority it needed to implement a full moratorium on commer-
cial whaling.73 In relevant part, the moratorium read: “[C]atch limits for
the killing for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986
coastal and the 1985 and 1986 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be
zero.”74 While a huge victory, the moratorium applied only to commercial
whaling—scientific and aboriginal whaling were still allowed.75
II. JAPAN’S RESPONSE TO THE MORATORIUM
The Japanese stated they “saw no legal or moral obligation to ac-
cept any decision of the commission” and as such, it objected to the 1982
moratorium and continued its commercial whaling operations.76 At the
73 ICRW, supra note 14, at Schedule 10(e).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 DAY, supra note 1, at 128.
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time, the United States had in place the Packwood-Magnuson Amend-
ment, which directed that any nation certified under the Pelly Amend-
ment as reducing the effectiveness of the Whaling Convention must have
its fishery allocation within the U.S. conservation zone reduced by at least
fifty percent.77 At the time, Japan had already been certified under the
Pelly Amendment, and thus the automatic sanctions of the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment should have kicked in.78
However, in defiance of the country’s own legislation, the Reagan
Administration conducted a secret meeting with the Japanese in 1984.79
The two governments struck a deal and the United States allowed Japan
to continue its commercial whaling operations until 1988 without fear of
sanctions.80
Domestic conservationists took their fight to the justice system.81
Twelve conservationist organizations filed suit in the Washington Dis-
trict court against the U.S. State and Federal Departments for failure to
implement the Packwood-Magnuson sanctions against the Japanese.82
The conservationists won at the district court level, but the government
appealed in 1985.83 Again, the appeals court ruled in favor of the conser-
vationists.84 In a strategic move, the government appealed to the Supreme
Court.85 By appealing to the highest Court, the decision would again be
delayed another year.86 Even if the Court ruled against the government,
the government would have a year in which to implement the sanctions.
By that time, it would be 1988 and the government’s agreement with Japan
would be over.87
In a 5–4 decision, the Court ruled in favor of the government and
reversed the two lower court decisions.88 There has been much specula-
tion on whether the Reagan Administration heavily pressured the Court
into this decision.89 “Most conservationists viewed the whole exercise as
77 Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1979).
78 DAY, supra note 1, at 129.
79 Id. at 128.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 129.
82 American Cetacean Soc’y v. Baldrige, 604 F. Supp. 1398 (D.D.C. 1985).
83 American Cetacean Soc’y v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
84 Id.
85 Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 474 U.S. 1053 (1986).
86 DAY, supra note 1, at 129.
87 Id.
88 Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
89 DAY, supra note 1, at 130.
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a vicious abuse of legal power and government money misused to betray
a cause the American public has strongly supported.”90
The Japanese had no intention of ceasing their whaling efforts in
1988.91 After his meeting with President Reagan in 1985, Moriyoshi Sato,
the Japanese Minister of Fisheries, assured his citizens that the govern-
ment would “do its utmost to find out ways to maintain the nation’s whal-
ing in the form of research or other forms.”92 True to his word, in 1987,
Japan issued itself a scientific research permit for the killing of whales.93
The Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the
Antarctic (“JARPA”) alleged four main objectives: (1) estimation of bio-
logical parameters to improve the stock management of the Southern
Hemisphere minke whale; (2) elucidate the role of whales in the Antarctic
marine ecosystem; (3) elucidation of the effect of environmental change on
cetaceans; and (4) elucidation of the stock structure of Southern Hemi-
sphere minke whales to improve stock management.94 The IWC objected
to the permit.95 Specifically, the Commission stated that the “proposed
research program as described . . . [did] not satisfy the criteria set out . . .
for scientific research in that the proposed research [did] not appear, on
present information, to be structured so as to contribute information es-
sential for rational management of the stock.”96 In its resolution, the Com-
mission asked the Japanese government to “refrain from issuing special
permits to its nationals for the taking of such whales” under JARPA “until
such time as the Scientific Committee is able to resolve the serious uncer-
tainties identified in its discussion as to the capability of the research
methods proposed.”97 Despite this, Japanese whalers killed their first
minke whale in the Antarctic in February of 1988.98
In a surprise move, given the administration’s former position,
President Reagan condemned Japan’s actions and initiated sanctions
90 Id.
91 Id. at 129.
92 Id.
93 Donald R. Rothwell, Australia v. Japan: JARPA II Whaling Case before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, THE HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL (July 2, 2010), http://www.haguejus
ticeportal.net/index.php?id=11840 [https://perma.cc/H8KD-PUZR].
94 Scientific Contribution JARPA/JARPA II, THE INSTITUTE OF CETACEAN RESEARCH,
http://www.icrwhale.org/scJARPA.html [https://perma.cc/HXH3-TEN9] (last visited Nov. 15,
2016).
95 INT’L WHALING COMM’N, Resolution on Japanese Proposal for Special Permits (1987) at 4.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 ELLIS, supra note 33, at 408–09.
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under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment.99 In a letter to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, President
Reagan discussed the “lack of any evidence that Japan is bringing its whal-
ing activities into conformance with the recommendations of the IWC”
and consequently “directed the Secretary of State under the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment to withhold 100 percent of the fishing privileges
that would otherwise be available to Japan in the U.S. Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone.”100 At the time, Japan had requested the opportunity to fish
for 3,000 metric tons of sea snails and 5,000 metric tons of Pacific whiting
in this U.S. controlled zone, both of which were denied.101 This cost the
Japanese an estimated $425 million in lost revenues per year.102
Despite this victory, the Reagan Administration refused to invoke
the Pelly Amendment against Japan and restrict the import of marine
products from Japan.103 Without the credible threat of trade sanctions,
Japan continued its “scientific whaling.”104 Over the continued objection
of the Commission, Japan hunted under JARPA until 2005.105 From 1987
to 2005, Japanese whalers killed a total of 6,700 Antarctic minke whales.106
In 1994, Japan issued itself another scientific permit called the
Japanese Whale Research Programme under Special Permit in the North
Pacific, or JARPN.107 The stated purpose of JARPN was to determine the
99 Letter from Ronald Reagan, XL President of the United States, to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate Reporting on Japanese Whaling
Activities (Apr. 6, 1988), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=35644 [https://
perma.cc/DMA7-3S4J].
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Richard Black, Did Greens Help Kill the Whale?, BBC NEWS (May 16, 2007), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6659401.stm [https://perma.cc/7BYF-5FWS].
103 Isao Miyaoka, Legitimacy in International Society: Japan’s Reaction to Global Wildlife
Preservation, 5 INT’L RELATIONS ASIA PACIFIC 278, 278–80 (2005) (book review).
104 Id.
105 IWC Scientific Committee, Report of the Intersessional Working Group to Review Data
and Results from Special Permit Research on Minke Whales in the Antarctic, SC/49/Rep1,
48 REPORT INT’L WHALING COMM’N 411, 377–412 (May 1997); IWC Scientific Committee,
Report of the Intersessional Workshop to Review Data and Results from Special Permit
Research on Minke Whales in the Antarctic, SC/59/Rep1, 10 J. Cetacean Research and
Management 411 (2006), at 9. The Scientific Committee reviewed JARPA in 1997 and
again in 2006. In both instances, the Committee questioned the validity of the program
and the data and recommended that Japan cease its whaling operations.
106 Remi Moncel, Dangerous Experiments: Scientific Integrity in International Environ-
mental Adjudications After the ICJ’s Decision in Whaling in the Antarctic, 42 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 305, 333 (2015).
107 Scientific Contribution JARPN/JARPNII, THE INSTITUTE OF CETACEAN RESEARCH, http://
www.icrwhale.org/scJARPN.html [https://perma.cc/2G7R-2QV2] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
2017] THE BATTLE OVER SCIENTIFIC WHALING 449
stock structure of common minke whales as well as the feeding ecology
in the North Pacific.108 The program called for the taking of 100 whales
annually.109 In the year 2000, the Scientific Committee reviewed the
program and urged Japan to cease its use of lethal research methods.110
In 2000, Japan issued itself JARPN II, which called for the taking
of 100 minke whales, fifty Bryde’s whales and ten sperm whales in the
North Pacific.111 The stated objectives were to study feeding ecology, stock
structure and the whale’s environmental impact on the region.112 The
study was completed in 2002, at which time Japan began a long-term
study on how whale feeding impacted Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone.113
Under this study, Japan proposed to take 340 minke whales, fifty Bryde’s
whales, 100 sei whales and ten sperm whales.114
JARPN II prompted much disagreement amongst the Scientific
Committee over the objectives, methodology, and value of the program.115
Unlike previous scientific permits, this study had no proposed end date.116
Ultimately, the Scientific Committee found the permit’s objectives
unnecessary for stock management and that the study findings would
not contribute to any research needs.117 The Committee continued to
disagree over whether lethal means were necessary in order to obtain the
data sought.118 The Commission passed resolutions in 2000, 2001, and
2003 urging Japan to cease the use of research permits for whaling and
halt its use of lethal research methods.119
In 2005, Japan issued itself a third scientific permit, the Japanese
Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the North Pacific
Phase II, or JARPA II.120 JARPA II consisted of six-year length phases
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Scientific Committee, Report of the Scientific Committee, 7 J. CETACEAN RESEARCH AND
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gramme-jarpn-ii-review [https://perma.cc/VE4C-BAW5].
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in which the government proposed to monitor the Antarctic ecosystem,
model competition among species, understand stock structure, and im-
prove management procedures.121 The permit authorized both lethal and
nonlethal research means and authorized the taking of fifty fin whales,
fifty humpback whales and 850 minke whales.122
Before the end of the first phase, Australia brought suit against
Japan in the International Court of Justice.123
III. THE AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE
Due to Australia’s proximity to the Antarctic waters, the country
has been one of the most vocal in opposing Japanese whaling.124 Along
with Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, and other environmental
groups, Australia has long argued that Japan’s scientific whaling is a
cover for commercial operations. Ironically, Australia was once a strong
proponent of the whaling industry.125 In the days leading up to the 1977
IWC meeting, anti-whaling activists chased Australian whaling vessels
off the West Australian coast.126 The vessel fired a harpoon, which hit
and sank the dinghy into shark-infested waters.127
The incident garnered worldwide media coverage.128 These chases
were followed by daily demonstrations outside the conference.129 With
heavy criticism being leveraged at the country as a result of the media
coverage, Australia changed its position within six months to join the
advocates of the moratorium.130
Support for the anti-whaling cause quickly swept through the
country.131 The Save the Whale Movement was an important platform for
the Prime Minister’s 1977 election campaign and an IWC opinion poll
revealed that seventy percent of Australians supported anti-whaling
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2016).
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efforts.132 Just one year later, in November of 1978, the last Australian
whaling company announced it would cease operations.133 The country
banned whaling outright by April 1979.134
In 1980, Australia enacted the Whale Protection Act. The Act’s
purpose was to “provide for the preservation, conservation and protection
of whales and other cetaceans.”135 The Act was the first of its kind, pro-
hibiting people from killing, capturing, injuring, or interfering with
whales, dolphins, and porpoises in Australian waters.136 The Act also spe-
cifically prohibited Australian citizens from engaging in whaling activi-
ties internationally.137 Finally, the Act banned the importation of all
whale products as of January 1981.138
In 1999, the country created a Whale Sanctuary with the passage
of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act of
1999.139 Specifically, the Act declared as a whale sanctuary the waters
from the three-mile state waters limit to the boundary of the country’s
Exclusive Economic Zone (i.e., roughly 200 miles from the coast).140 Severe
penalties attached to anyone violating the Act.141
Australia’s relationship with Japan over whaling has been strained
over the past decades. In 2007, over concerns that Japanese whalers were
violating the Whale Sanctuary, the Australian government announced
plans to monitor Japanese whalers entering the waters for a potential
international legal challenge.142 In 2008, Australia sent the Oceanic Viking
on a surveillance mission.143 From this endeavor, Australia released photos
132 Id. at 149–50.
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of a mother and calf minke whale being killed by Japanese whalers
within the Sanctuary.144
As a result, Australia threatened to sue Japan if it did not cease
its whaling efforts in the Southern Ocean.145 New Zealand also indicated
that it was considering a case against Japan.146
Japan responded, claiming that it does not recognize Australia’s
territorial claim on the waters and would not cease its whaling efforts in
the Southern Ocean.147 In 2009, Australia’s Prime Minister again reiter-
ated the country’s intent to take international legal action.148 “[I]f we
cannot resolve this matter diplomatically, we will take international legal
action. I’m serious about it, I would prefer to deal with it diplomatically,
but if we cannot get there, that’s the alternative course of action.”149
Diplomacy failed and on May 31, 2010, the Australian govern-
ment filed formal proceedings against Japan in the International Court
of Justice in the Hague, Netherlands.150
IV. WHALING IN JAPAN: AUSTRALIA V. JAPAN
In 2014 Australia, joined by New Zealand, brought suit against
Japan in the International Court of Justice.151 In its initial application
to the Court, Australia made four main requests of the Court:
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1. to “adjudge and declare that Japan is in breach of
its international obligations in implementing the
JARPA II program in the Southern Ocean”;
2. to order that Japan “cease implementation of
JARPA II”;
3. to revoke any authorizations, permits, or licenses
allowing whaling; and
4. to provide assurances and guarantees that Japan
will not take any further action under JARPA II or
any similar program until such program complies
with the Commission’s requirements and interna-
tional law.152
A. Jurisdiction of the Court
Japan first challenged the jurisdiction of the Court.153 In rejecting
Japan’s argument and holding that the Court did have proper jurisdic-
tion over the case, the Court noted that the case was about whether
Japan had unlawfully violated its obligations under the ICRW and not
whether Japan was whaling in a maritime zone over which Australia
asserted sovereign rights.154
Thus, having determined the Court had jurisdiction to hear the
case, the Court proceeded to address the merits of the case.155
1. Standard of Review
The Court next turned to what the appropriate standard of review
should be in reviewing the grant of a special permit “authorizing the
killing, taking and treating of whales on the basis of Article VIII, para-
graph 1, of the Convention.”156
Article VIII, paragraph 1 of the Convention states that a special
permit may be authorized to “kill, take and treat whales for the purposes
of scientific research subject to such restrictions” imposed by the Con-
tracting Government.157
152 Whaling in the Antarctic, supra note 150, at 40–41.
153 Austl. v. Japan: N.Z. intervening, 2014 I.C.J. 226, 238–39, ¶ 24 (Mar. 31).
154 Id. at 246, ¶¶ 40–41.
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The Court broke down the above paragraph and examined the
phrases “for purposes of” and “scientific research” separately. Interest-
ingly enough, the Court rejected Australia’s proposed four-step criteria
for what constitutes “scientific research”158 but did not “consider it neces-
sary to devise alternative criteria or to offer a general definition of ‘scien-
tific research.’ ”159
As to “for the purposes of,” the Court concluded that a government
may have multiple objectives in instituting a research program, and also
that the fact that a program “involves the sale of whale meat and the use
of proceeds to fund research is not sufficient, taken alone, to cause a
special permit to fall outside Article VIII.”160
Ultimately, the Court (somewhat haphazardly) set the standard
of review as whether the methods (i.e., lethal sampling) are “reasonable
in relation to achieving the programme’s stated research objectives. The
research objectives alone must be sufficient to justify the programme as
designed and implemented.”161
2. The Court’s Conclusions
The Court seemed skeptical of Japan’s arguments from the begin-
ning of the opinion. At issue throughout the opinion were the apparent
inconsistencies between the proposed research program under JARPA II
and the way in which Japan actually implemented the program. While
the Court found that the “use of lethal sampling per se is not unreason-
able in relation to the research objectives of JARPA II,”162 the Court did
find that the means in which Japan carried out the program were “not
reasonable in relation to achieving the programme’s objectives.”163
First, the Court found that while the objectives of JARPA and
JARPA II were roughly identical, JARPA II outlined a considerable in-
crease in lethal whale sampling without sufficient explanation.164 Second,
the sample sizes for fin and humpback whales, two species which JARPA
II sought to research, were “too small to provide the information that is
necessary to pursue the JARPA II research objectives based on Japan’s
158 Id. at 258, ¶ 83.
159 Austl. v. Japan: N.Z. intervening, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. at 238–39 ¶ 24.
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own calculations, and the programme’s design [appeared] to prevent the
random sampling of fin whales.”165 Third, the Court held that “the pro-
cess used to determine the sample size for minke whales lack[ed] trans-
parency.”166 Fourth, the Court held that some evidence “suggest[ed] that
little attention was given to the possibility of using non-lethal research
methods more extensively to achieve the JARPA II objectives and that
funding considerations, rather than strictly scientific criteria, played a
role in the programme’s design.”167
In addition to the problems with the actual research program
design, the Court took issue with the way in which the program was
implemented.168 First, no humpback whales were sampled, despite a
catch-limit of fifty whales annually outlined in JARPA II.169 Second, the
actual take of fin whales accounted for only a small percentage of what
the research plan actually prescribed.170 Third, the actual take of minke
whales was much lower than what the research plan prescribed.171
Fourth, neither “JARPA II’s objectives nor its methods have been revised
or adapted to take account of the actual number of whales taken.”172
Furthermore, Japan failed to “explain how those research objectives
remain viable given the decision to use six-year and 12-year research
periods for different species, coupled with the apparent decision to aban-
don the lethal sampling of humpback whales entirely and to take very
few fin whales.”173
Ultimately, the Court was not convinced that the program was
for purposes of scientific research.174 Accordingly, the Court held that
“JARPA II involves activities that can broadly be characterized as scien-
tific research, but that the evidence does not establish that the pro-
gramme’s design and implementation are reasonable in relation to
achieving its stated objectives.”175 Thus, the Court concluded “that the
special permits granted by Japan for the killing, taking and treating of
165 Austl. v. Japan: N.Z. intervening, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. at 292 ¶ 24.
166 Id. at 292–93, ¶ 225.
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whales in connection with JARPA II are not for purposes of scientific
research pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Convention.”176
3. Remedies
Australia requested that Japan: (a) refrain from authorizing spe-
cial permit whaling, which is not explicitly for scientific research under
Article VIII; (b) immediately cease the implementation of JARPA II; and
(c) “revoke any authorization, permit or license that allows the imple-
mentation of JARPA II.”177 The Court agreed to two of the three requests,
ordering “that Japan shall revoke any extant authorization, permit or
license to kill, take or treat whales in relation to JARPA II, and refrain
from granting any further permits under Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the
Convention, in pursuance of that programme.”178
However, the Court saw “no need to order the additional remedy
requested by Australia, which would require Japan to refrain from au-
thorizing or implementing any special permit whaling which is not for
purposes of scientific research within the meaning of Article VIII [be-
cause] that obligation already applies to all State parties.”179
V. JAPANESE AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE
HAGUE’S DECISION
Humanitarians saw the International Court of Justice’s decision
as a major victory. Many saw the ruling as elevating environmental
concerns and respect for international environmental law over “political
considerations.”180 After the decision was announced, Japan made all
indications that it would comply with the Court’s ruling.181
Noriyuki Shikata, Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman for the
Japanese delegation to the International Court of Justice said, “Japan
was ‘disappointed’ by the court’s decision but would abide by it ‘as a state
176 Id.
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that places great importance on the international legal order and the
rule of law as a basis of the international community.”182 Shikata contin-
ued, saying, “In terms of a future course of action, people in Tokyo will
examine that, but we have made our position clear—that we will abide
by the judgment.”183
Inherent in the Court’s decision was the ability for Japan to revise
its whaling program in order to comply with Article VIII of the Conven-
tion.184 Thus, despite giving all indications that it would cease its whaling
operations in the Antarctic following the Court’s ruling, Japan announced
in early January of 2015 its plans to resume its Antarctic whaling.185 In
a statement, Japan’s newly formed New Scientific Whale Research Pro-
gram in the Antarctic Ocean (officially titled NEWREP-A, but referred
to commonly as JARPA III) said, “After giving serious scientific consider-
ation, it has been concluded that age data at the annual scale can be
obtained only through lethal sampling methods, and thus lethal methods
need to be employed under this program.”186
VI. NEWREP-A/JARPA III
This new program was scheduled to start in the summer of 2015
and last for twelve initial years.187 The proposal calls for the taking of
333 minke whales, which is an increase from the 252 whales that were
killed in the final year of JARPA II.188 The plan also covers a larger area
around the Antarctic (Figure 3).189 This new proposed research area over-
laps with the Commission’s Whale Sanctuary (Figure 4).190
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The proposal itself is over one hundred pages long and discusses
the requirements of the Court’s ruling at length.191 The stated objectives
of the proposal are to: (1) improve the precision of biological and ecologi-
cal information regarding Antarctic minke whales; and (2) investigate the
structure and dynamics of the Antarctic ecosystem.192
Greenpeace, the IFAW, and the WWF have all criticized Japan’s
new proposal as “contrary to the obligations to take account of the Court’s
reasoning and conclusions.”193 First, conservationists point to Japan’s fail-
ure to have the permit reviewed by the Scientific Committee, as required
by the newly adopted Resolution 2014-5.194 Second, the main objectives
of NEWREP-A have been criticized as being much the same objectives
under JARPA and JAPRA II.195 Third, Japan stated in the proposal that
the sampling design of JARPA II was largely successful.196 However, the
Scientific Committee’s review of JARPA concluded that after eighteen
years and 7,000 kills, the main research objectives of the program re-
mained largely unmet.197 Thus, conservationists have been quick to ask
how this new program, which mirrors its predecessors, will “be able to
_wwf_doing_to_protect_whales/whale_sanctuaries/ [https://perma.cc/ZX5J-3X3Y] (last
visited Nov. 15, 2016). Note, the yellow dotted line indicates the boundary of the Sanctuary.
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answer the scientific questions that the first two [programs] failed to
answer.”198
Ultimately, it appears that Japan’s new program is a cleverly
worded scheme to “justify its scientific objectives”199 while skirting the
true spirit and holding of the Court’s decision.
VII. CONTINUED DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN
In defense of its new plan, “Japan says it wants to collect more
data on the Antarctic minke whale population—in case the moratorium
is ever lifted—and to study the Antarctic marine ecosystem.”200 However,
the “IWC panel concluded that the Japanese proposal lacked clear scien-
tific objectives and contained ‘insufficient information’ to complete a full
review.”201 The IWC informed Japan that it would review the proposed
plan and provide recommendations at the annual meeting of the IWC
Scientific Committee in May of 2015.202
At the time, despite no clear permission from the International
Whaling Commission, Japan asserted that it has the right to hunt whales
in the Antarctic.203 Once the panel reviewed Japan’s new proposal at the
May meeting, it ultimately concluded that the program did not justify the
killing and taking of whales on scientific grounds.204 “The committee
deferred a potential decision until its next meeting, in 2016, but 44 com-
mittee members from 13 countries signed a statement agreeing that
there was no scientific reason to kill whales for research.”205
In November of 2015, an Australian court responded to the con-
tinued whaling by Japan in parts of the Australian Southern Ocean Sanc-
tuary by imposing an AU$1,000,000 (approximately $700,000 USD) fine on
Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha, the Japanese firm responsible for the violation.206
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The Japanese whalers are now also facing suits filed by the Sea
Shepherd (an international non-profit marine conservation group) in
the federal district court in Seattle, Washington.207 “Sea Shepherd has
asked the court to find that Japan’s Southern Ocean whaling program
violates international law, and to impose an injunction to prevent it from
continuing.”208
VIII. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Court’s Decision
With such mounting pressure to cease its whaling operations, con-
servationists are left asking two questions: (1) why does Japan believe its
renewed whaling efforts comply with the Hague’s decision; and (2) why
does the Japanese government insist on hunting whales?
Japan maintains that it will abide by the Hague’s decision.209 Yet,
Japan also plans to begin hunting minke whales in 2016.210 How does the
Japanese government square these two statements?
The issue lies with the Hague decision itself. The Court narrowed
its ruling to whether or not JARPA II met the whaling convention’s
requirements.211 While this is a great victory for activists, the decision
only worked to cease Japan’s whaling under that specific permit.
First, the decision is extremely limited in scope. The Court limited
its discussion to lethal sampling under JARPA II.212 The Court did not
widen the scope of the case and say that scientific whaling in general is
unlawful.213 Throughout the decision, the Court was careful to carve out
exceptions and narrow its discussion to only the JARPA II permit. Dis-
cussions on aboriginal subsistence whaling were expressly excluded from
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the Court’s discussions. As such, the Court’s decision applies only to the
Southern Ocean, leaving open the possibility that Japan begin other
similar whaling operations in different areas.214 Furthermore, the Court
was quite careful to state that its decision was not meant to pass judg-
ment on larger policy views of whaling.
Second, the decision lacks procedural clarity.215 The Court did not
engage in a discussion of what “science” is in terms of whaling. The ICJ
does not allow amicus briefs.216 As such, the Court’s understanding as to
the science behind Japan’s whaling was limited. While the Court did
weigh in on how much deference to give a nation’s scientific findings, it
did not provide a standard for “the admission of scientific evidence, a
standard or proof,” or clarify who bears the “burden of proving scientific
facts.”217 This lack of procedural clarity creates difficulties for countries,
like Australia, who wish to claim that a permit is not meeting its scien-
tific requirements. If there is no specified scientific standard, how can
the international community know when it has been violated?
Third, the Court’s decision is not binding. It does not bind itself,
nor does it bind other international tribunals.218 “Limited resources, state
political pressure, lack of scientific expertise, or limited transparency
could tilt the balance against scientific integrity.”219 A lack of clarity,
coupled with a non-binding decision creates room for exploitation. “In
short, it is dangerous to leave environmental protection at the mercy of
international tribunals’ ad hoc procedural experiments.”220
Lastly, there are no enforcement mechanisms. At the end of its
decision, the Court merely declares that JARPA II lacked scientific merit
and did not conform to the requirements set forth by the Commission. So
what next? If Japan decided to continue its hunts under the guise of
JARPA II or other similar permit, the Court lacks any real power to stop it.
Thus, while the Hague’s decision is seen as a large political vic-
tory, the scope of the decision itself is extremely narrow. Japan is free to
submit, and has done so, requests for new whaling permits.221 The Court
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set a low bar in terms of requirements Japan must meet in order to
obtain a permit. “The Court did not set specific limits on the number or
species of whale that Japan could legitimately target . . . [it] simply
[ruled] that the sample sizes needed to be ‘reasonable.’ ”222
As such, Japan can submit a new permit application and still be
in compliance with the Court’s decision. An application that sets a “less
ambitious scientific [objective] and . . . [seeks] to take fewer whales,”
would likely meet or exceed the Court’s recommendations and eliminate
Japan’s risk for recrimination.223
B. Japanese Cultural Tradition
The popularity for whale meat in Japan is dwindling. In fact,
“whale meat was only [ ] popular across the island nation during a short
period following World War II.”224 So why, in the face of global criticism,
does the Japanese government continue to pursue whaling? The first
reason is cultural. Many scholars have argued that Japanese people “don’t
tend to see whales as charismatic mammals that should be protected from
human consumption by a universal taboo.”225 In Japan, whales are con-
sidered to be “really big fish” and “most Japanese lack any special love
of whales and disagree with Western animal rights activists who [insist]
on whales’ rights.”226
This sentiment was perfectly expressed in a 1988 letter to the
editor of the Yomiuri Daily, a Tokyo newspaper:
First of all, we must get this straight: whales are born to
be exploited. Unless we start with this consensus, our
arguments will get nowhere. Second, we should emphasize
that minke whales are not on the endangered species list.
Therefore, there can be nothing wrong with catching a
reasonable number of them. Third, we should repeat that
no one has the right to dictate to others what they should
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or should not eat. No one but the barbarians who do not
appreciate cultural relativism and subtlety would under-
take such an absurdity. One senses a tinge of cultural
arrogance lurking on the part of those who attempt to dis-
credit whaling.227
C. Politics and Food Security
The second justification for Japan’s continued whaling efforts is po-
litical. Many believe that Japan sees whaling as political turf to be main-
tained in the face of global condemnation—both domestic and abroad.
Domestically, the interministerial rivalries within the Japanese
government are intense. “It is not likely that one actor would voluntarily
concede one of their areas of jurisdiction. Should the whaling program
end, certain officials would find themselves out of work.”228
Abroad, some scholars point to Japan’s concerns over food secu-
rity.229 During the twentieth century, the Japanese government has
made food security a chief concern among the public.230 “Dependence on
imports is a common media discourse in Japan. It both expresses food
security concerns among the public and helps to reproduce them.”231 As
such, consumers are encouraged and taught to “side with producers in a
joint effort” to work towards self-sufficiency in food.232 Japanese insis-
tence on whaling illustrates this line of thinking. Whaling is seen as a
step towards food supply self-sufficiency and, thus, the public is taught
to support it.
D. The Commission
The third justification is the International Whaling Commission
itself. The struggle over Japanese whaling is a great case study, which
highlights the difficult situation in which the Commission has been put.
The Commission was never a conservationist group, and yet it has now
been given that mantle. Many of the 1980s conservationist groups de-
scribed the Commission as “a ‘whalers’ club’ . . . [where delegates] . . . sat
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down at a table and bargained until they agreed among themselves what
the sporting number of whales to be bagged this year would be.”233
The structure and treatises under which the Commission operates
were written at a time when the Commission’s main objective was to
protect whales for whaling, not from whaling. There are no provisions for
the enforcement of the Schedule, and member nations may simply object
to the Schedule and continue their whaling operations as they please.234
The way in which the Commission operates can be seen in a larger
context of undermining the effect and validity of international treaties.
If a nation is going to be a member nation under an international treaty,
it should not be able to “object” to the treaty’s goals while still remaining
a member nation. This juxtaposition weakens the integrity of all interna-
tional treaties.
E. Proposed Solution
This Note proposes a trifold solution to the Japanese whaling prob-
lem. The first prong addresses Japanese cultural perception of whales as
food, the second addresses Japanese food security concerns, and the third,
the IWC itself.
“One senses a tinge of cultural arrogance lurking on the part of
those who attempt to discredit whaling.”235 If it is true that the majority
of the Japanese see the Save the Whale movement as the West attempt-
ing to push their ideals onto another nation, it is understandable why the
nation has been stubborn in its reluctance to stop whaling. As expressed
in the editorial, many may see this Western pressure as a threat to Japan’s
sovereignty. “Sovereignty is the legal expression of national independ-
ence. Sovereignty is to a nation what liberty is to an individual.”236
In the face of such strong sentiment, how does one create mean-
ingful change? Australia itself is a wonderful case study. The country
went from a great supporter of whaling to one of the industry’s staunch-
est critics. This change was largely effected through grassroots move-
ments and international media pressure. In much the same way, a strong
Japanese grassroots movement could bring about a switch in the way the
country’s public perceives whaling.
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Of utmost importance is the idea that the movement come from
within Japan. If the movement were to be Western led, it would be seen
as the West attempting to force its ideals upon the island nation, and it
will fail. There is already a foundation set in Japan for an anti-whaling
movement. In 1989, a Japanese anti-whaling group, the Elsa Nature
Conservancy, released its first press release, which was distributed to
delegates at that year’s IWC meeting.237
Eiji Fujiwara, the then director of the group, wrote in the publica-
tion’s opening statement:
The Japanese whaling industry is structurally a semi-
government operation and to the world opinion which has
tilted toward the ban on commercial whaling, the Fisher-
ies Agency of the government and the whaling companies
together stood against it. Moreover, they carried out pro-
paganda and manipulated the public opinion so that there
would be no voice against the national policy within the
nation.238
In a separate publication, Fujiwara noted that: (1) whaling was
started in 1933 by outsiders and thus was not a Japanese cultural tra-
dition; (2) financial contributions of whaling are insignificant; (3) the
habit of eating whale meat only developed recently; (4) local demand for
whale meat is decreasing; and (5) many whaling towns have developed
post-whaling plans.239
The fact that there exists at least one Japanese anti-whaling
group is encouraging. It signals that there are those within the nation
that support the movement. Community outreach and education can
surely work from within the nation to build greater support for the anti-
whaling movement.
Second, Japan sees the ability to whale as integrally tied to their
food supplies and, thus, national security. Often touted as a reason for
continuing to whale, the Japanese believe that if they voluntarily cease
whaling, then countries may eventually put pressure on them to halt
their other fishing efforts. As an island nation, it “gets a large proportion
of its protein from fish and shellfish.”240 As opposed to the United States,
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which is a “vast, rich country with millions of acres committed to raising
food,” Japan’s population is:
crammed into the rocky islands. . . . Conservation is a
luxury that Japan can ill afford if they expect to feed their
120 million people. Lack of space also means that the
Japanese cannot economically raise cattle or pigs, since
most of the feed that might be used to cultivate these ani-
mals has to be imported.241
Yet, while whaling may be what is held up to protect Japan’s
interest in fishing, the government needs to realize that this position
hinders their interests more than it helps. A Google image search of
“Japanese Whaling” will produce thousands of grisly images depicting
mother whales and calves being hauled aboard Japanese vessels, blood
stained waters, and blood stained decks carrying dismembered whales.242
Over the years, whales and dolphins have held the fascination of
the public as new research reveals that these creatures have a “rare
intelligence in the animal kingdom.”243 Researchers suggest that ceta-
ceans may actually be more advanced than humans in speech production,
emotions, and cognition.244 According to a study out of Michigan State
University, cetaceans “have the distinct advantage over [humans] in that
their primary sense is the same as their primary means of communica-
tion, both are auditory. With primates, the primary sense is visual and the
primary means of communication is auditory.”245 As a result, researchers
theorize that cetaceans are “able to project an ‘auditory image’ that repli-
cates a sonar message they may receive.”246 The equivalent in the human
world would be the ability to “create instantaneous holographic pictures
to convey images to other people.”247
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Research has also revealed that the limbic system of whales is “so
large it erupts into the cortex in the form of an extra paralimbic lobe.”248
The limbic system of cetaceans, the system which creates emotions and
is the foundation of memories, is therefore larger and more complex than
that of humans.249
As human understanding of cetaceans grows, so does the public’s
special fascination with these creatures. Japan’s continued whaling
efforts are seen to the rest of the world as “barbaric.”250 An online com-
ment to a news article covering resumed Japanese whaling after the
Hague’s decision states, “Consecutive federal governments have done
absolutely nothing to stop this barbaric practice which also thumbs its
nose at international treaties and our territorial sovereignty.”251 This
statement demonstrates how strongly the public feels about Japan’s
whaling policy, seeing it even as a violation of international treaties and
a threat to national security.
Japan’s stance on whaling has actually led to greater food security
concerns. Recall that in 1988, President Reagan directed the Secretary
of State under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to withhold 100
percent of Japan’s fishing privileges in the United States Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone.252
Japan’s food security concerns are not unfounded. When a large
percentage of food is imported, a nation becomes “particularly vulnerable
to natural disasters and global [events] that might disrupt shipping and
the food supply.”253 However, there are less controversial ways to combat
this concern. Hawaii makes a great case study. In 2012, the island state
released its “Increased Food Security and Food Self-Sufficient Strategy.”254
In its report, the state estimated that eighty-five to ninety percent of food
is imported. To combat this, the state proposed three objectives: increase
demand for and access to locally grown foods, increase production of locally
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grown foods, and provide policy and organizational support to meet food
self-sufficiency needs.255
Among its recommendations were things such as encouraging
residents to buy locally grown food through a marketing campaign, cre-
ating a fund to repair and maintain irrigation systems, and promoting
workforce developments in agricultural, energy, and natural resource
related sectors.256 While the strategy would have to be adjusted to meet
Japan’s unique needs, such a program would be a great starting place to
increase Japan’s self-sufficiency, and thus decrease the nation’s food
security concerns.
Third is the International Whaling Commission itself. While
drastic, there are two solutions for dealing with this issue. The first is to
completely rewrite the Convention and the Schedule. The current Con-
vention and Schedule are written in a way to allow for whaling. Public
sentiment and attitudes towards whaling has changed since these docu-
ments were drafted in 1946. Whales used to be used for lamp oil, cooking
oil, candles, soaps, cosmetics, corsets, umbrellas, animal feed, fertilizer,
and string for tennis racquets.257 Modern innovation has made replace-
ments for all of these products.258 Currently, the only product produced
from whaling is whale meat itself.259 Rewriting the controlling documents
with a modern perspective would go a long way to protecting whales for
their own sake, rather than for the sake of would-be whalers.
Should the Convention be rewritten, of utmost importance would
be the way in which scientific permits are issued. Instead of allowing
member nations to “object” or issue scientific permits themselves, the
Scientific Committee should have the exclusive authority to issue re-
search permits. Should a member nation desire to contribute to scientific
inquiry by conducting research whaling, such permit applications should
first be filed with the Scientific Committee.
If the member nation puts forth an application which requests
lethal sampling, such permits should be reviewed with great care. First,
the reviewing committee should inquire into whether the nation can
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accomplish the research without the lethal sampling. If not, the Commit-
tee should then weigh whether or not the research is of significant value
to justify the taking of a life.
Another important provision that should be addressed in new
controlling documents would be enforcement mechanisms. For example,
member nations should agree that if they are found in violation of the
Commission’s Schedule or permitting regulations, the Commission will
assess a fine to that member nation. These fines could then be used to
fund whaling conservation efforts.
Self-monitoring and reporting by the member nations would be an
effective way to ensure compliance. Should any member nation suspect
another of violating the Schedule or permitting regulations, or should a
third party submit evidence to the Commission of a violation, a reviewing
committee of disinterested members could form to evaluate the accusa-
tions and assess their credibility.
The second, and somewhat related, proposed solution would be to
disband the IWC and hold a new convention. The current Commission
has come under severe criticism for its failure to protect smaller ceta-
ceans such as dolphins.260 A newly formed commission could properly
address these concerns instead of attempting to patch what the current
Commission has failed to address. Should a new convention be held, the
same provisions detailed above should be incorporated into the newly
formed commission’s charter.
CONCLUSION
“What is it in our nature that propels us to continue a hunt
initiated in earlier times?”261 Human attitude toward whales has made
tremendous progress since the first whaling convention. Conservationists
have finally seen a long-awaited victory on an international level. And
yet, Japan is propelled to continue this archaic hunt.
While cultural sensitivity should not be taken lightly, the ques-
tion must be asked: when does the importance of morality outweigh the
importance of cultural norms? As science continues to progress and under-
stand cetaceans, the truth about their intelligence is becoming increas-
ingly clear: whales are not simply “big fish,” but rather intelligent and
social creatures who, in many ways, lead lives similar to humans.
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Grassroots support against whaling has died down significantly
since its inception; yet, human activities still threaten many species of
whales. Chief among them is Japan’s insistence on scientific whaling.
An in-depth look at Japan’s research reveals that it is less about
science, and more about political positioning. Concerns over national
sovereignty and food security drive Japan’s whaling policy. At the center
is the International Whaling Commission, originally an organization set
up for whalers, now charged with protecting whales from whalers.
Outdated and outmoded, the agreement under which the Commis-
sion operates does not provide the requisite tools to handle such a charge.
As a result, the Commission stands idle as nations like Japan continue
to engage in commercial whaling under the guise of scientific research.
Japan’s concerns can be addressed in a way that would obviate its
need for whaling. Anti-whaling initiatives can be encouraged within the
country through grassroots campaigns, and food security concerns can be
improved through effective marketing, funding, and investment in nat-
ural resource development.
The Commission itself needs updating. Reforms that concentrate
permitting power with the Scientific Committee and provide for enforce-
ment mechanisms should be adopted, whether it be through a Conven-
tion rewrite or rebirth.
“Men, attracted by the treasure that the victory over the whales
might afford him, has troubled the peace of their immense solitary abodes,
[and] violated their refuges.”262 These words were first written over two
centuries ago. The time for courage and conviction is now. Let us speak
for those who have no voice and trouble no more these giants of the deep.
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